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Although HRBAs have been widely discussed and used, definitions vary; and there is not, to our knowledge, an authoritative source. For our purposes, we define HRBAs as principles that justify demands against privileged actors, made by the poor or those speaking on their behalf, for using national and international resources and rules to protect the crucial human interests of the globally or locally disadvantaged. Note that this account takes sides on some of the semantic controversies surrounding human rights: it does not distinguish between so-called -positive‖ (economic, social, and cultural) rights and -negative‖ (civil and political) rights, merely noting that both may involve crucial interests; nor does it restrict the targets of human rights claims to states or governments, leaving open the idea that individuals, firms, and other private actors may be duty-bearers.
The definition is also narrower than most accounts of rights claims. More particularly, this definition of HRBAs (i) does not include the rights of the relatively well-off, focusing instead on poverty; and (ii) emphasizes resources and regulation rather than the more interactional duties that arise from the natural law and natural rights traditions. (It is for this reason that we refer, in this paper, to -human rights based approaches,‖ rather than the more widely used phrase -rights based approaches‖ to development.) HRBAs, moreover, do not subsume the various other social practices and rules that underpin political morality, social stability, and modern economic growth. HRBAs may include principles by which these other institutions and rules systems might be evaluated; but HRBAs cannot construct all social principles from the ground up, as they leave out many obvious and important elements of social organization. For these reasons, and probably others as well, it would be a mistake to equate HRBAs with more encompassing accounts of social justice or social change. In particular, we understand HRBAs to be targeted interventions on the part of governments and donors; and we 4 distinguish them from broader transformations in state-society relations, such as democratization or the creation of -open access orders‖ (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009) up to international and regional human rights treaty commitments, enhancing a variety of accountability oriented institutions in governments and donors (e.g., human rights commissions, ombudsmen, agencies of administrative redress), persuading citizens to think of themselves as rights-holders through civil society-based rhetoric, and employing legal mobilization in national courts.
2 In a given country, HRBAs might employ any combination of these -mechanisms,‖ and the quality of the institutions sustaining these sub-approaches varies significantly, even within a given country. As a result, it is difficult to demarcate the boundaries of an HRBA in a given context, and to identify its contribution to development in isolation from the institutions it relies on. The approach we take here, therefore, is analytic rather than strictly empirical. We differentiate HRBAs on the basis of four analytic components: HRBAs rooted in international and regional treaties, policies and principles of donors and executive agencies, normative beliefs, and constitutional rights. We try to assess the prospects for each on the basis of extant research on the channels through which they are likely to operate. One analytic component of HRBAs pressures states to ratify these regional and international instruments, and uses the fact of ratification to hold states to account for the delivery of increased and higher quality development assistance. This holding to account can 6 take both legal and political forms, and can operate both on rich country governments and on developing country governments. When first conceived in the mid to late 1940s, the international human rights regime was intended to operate juridically (Beitz 2009; Glendon 2002 At the regional level, quasi-juridical human rights treaty bodies have made significant rulings in a number of cases (Langford 2008a; Langford 2008b) . The numbers of rulings related to development are relatively small (the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had issued some 92 opinions in 2009), and partial or non-compliance are more common than full compliance (Hawkins and Jacoby 2008) . The basic problem remains that of the absence of a political authority above states, or international anarchy, which neo-realists emphasize (Krasner 1993 ).
The strongest effects of international human rights treaties are expected to be visible at the national, rather than the international or regional, levels. The literature has developed an approach to human rights treaty compliance that Simmons (2009:125) Hathaway finds that -state expressions of commitment to human rights through treaty ratification may sometimes relieve pressure on states to pursue real changes in their policies and thereby undermine the instrumental aims of those very same treaties.‖ (Hathaway 2002) Simmons (2009) is probably the most optimistic, finding that treaty ratification was associated with better performance on child labor and gender equality. Overall, however, the empirical work on the contemporaneous effects of treaty ratification on development outcomes is relatively limited, and the findings mixed.
Constructivists, however, argue that over longer time periods debates surrounding human rights can change identities, interests, and preferences in such a way that government leaders and citizens begin to embrace human rights norms. The processes through which these change include NGO pressure and transnational advocacy that eventually lead governments to move from repressing human rights movements to endorsing them, often by enhancing the stature of 9 reformers in the coalition . (This suggests that some constructivist accounts are not inconsistent with domestic mobilization explanations.) On the other hand, the processes can be more sociological in nature, involving personal and institutional interactions that lead particular interpretations of human rights norms to be internalized (Koh 1999) , or peer influences to affect observable behavior through processes of acculturation (Goodman and Jinks 2005) .
In summary, theory suggests that treaty-based HRBAs are more likely to achieve -enforcement‖ or -compliance‖ at the national level through domestic political mechanisms, such as civil society organizations, courts, and bureaucratic entrepreneurs, than at the international or regional levels through quasi-juridical enforcement. The evidence to date indicates that treaties can have some limited direct, contemporaneous impact on development outcomes. It is likely that treaties have more long-term effects on development policies through constructivist channels; but more empirical work along these lines remains to be done.
Policies and Programming
A number of international and bilateral development agencies have endorsed a human rights orientation in the provision of health care and education in developing countries. 6 The notion of rights as high priority goals is implicit in some of the legal documents underlying the rights approach to development. The WHO Constitution, 1946 , and the Declaration of Alma Ata, 1978, for instance, make reference to the -highest attainable standard of health,‖ which implicitly acknowledges that many developing countries cannot provide comprehensive health care for all of their citizens. The WHO interprets the principle to mean that governments should put into place -policies and action plans which will lead to available and accessible health care for all in the shortest possible time.‖ (WHO 2002) The UN also describes the right to education as a mandate that is being progressively realized (UNESCO 2000) . A number of large international and domestic NGOs have also adopted human rights based approach to service provision.
It is difficult to characterize the policies and programming approaches because they sometimes include neighboring development interventions, and sometimes do not. These neighboring development interventions involve a variety of efforts to introduce accountability into development governance, and include urban service delivery scorecards, social audits, the establishment of redress mechanisms in donor projects and government line agencies, participatory involvement in development programming such as -community-driven development,‖ and national consultations such as poverty-reduction strategy processes (PRSPs).
Policies and programing can also involve strengthening human rights commissions, information campaigns, and creating or strengthening public sector ombudsmen or other accountability offices (e.g., comptrollers, auditors, the -Ministerios Publicos‖ in Latin America). Some forms of HRBAs emphasize participation in sectors, such as informed consent so that patients can make fully informed treatment decisions and parental participation so that local understandings of respect for elders and holidays are included in classroom practices. More encompassing accounts of HRBAs in donor policies include putting conditionality for development assistance on human rights performance, placing greater weight on distributional outcomes instead of average growth or employment rates, working with excluded populations, policy dialogue on human rights conducted by development agencies, and human rights-related projects (e.g., security forces training and prison conditions projects).
There is now some evidence on the effectiveness of HRBAs in these settings, but the overall effects seem to vary with the local context and institutional details. For instance, a newspaper campaign in Uganda aimed at reducing corruption by providing schools and parents with information to monitor the way that local officials handled educational transfers reduced the capture of public funds and increased student enrollment and learning (Reinikka and Svensson 2005) . But in a set of interventions in India, however, there was no significant effect of information campaigns on community involvement, teacher effort, or learning outcomes (Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani 2008) .
Rights Talk and Rights Consciousness
Rights-based approaches to development do not always take the form of formal institutions and mechanisms, such as international human rights treaties or human rights based approaches to programming, policy and legislation. They also, potentially, constitute -politics from below‖ or processes of -social accountability‖ (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006 ) that activists, non-governmental organizations, and social movements engage in. Merry (2003) notes that -rights talk remains a dominant framework for contemporary social justice movements‖;
and, more generally, Dembour (1996) observes that it is hardly possible to open a newspaper without coming across a reference to human rights.
As noted above, we understand HRBAs to include rights talk where the poor or those speaking on their behalf address human rights based claims against privileged actors, in order to protect their crucial human interests. We exclude, here, rights talk that defends the intellectual property of firms and other privileged actors, libertarian discourse that understands redistribution to be rights violation, and related arguments. This understanding highlights a conceptual and political problem for this HRBA channel: a crucial aspect of human rights is their role in elevating the dignity, self-esteem, and capacity to mobilize of those whose rights are violated or unfulfilled, but the rights discourse they then use for political mobilization is also a bulwark to protect the interests of the privileged. Although HRBAs typically focus on the rights-holders, they can also affect duty-bearers by activating their moral obligations. They might directly influence developing country officials and politicians when they formulate and implement government policies on topics such as school fees, child labor, taxation, and social assistance. They might also influence governments in rich countries to increase development assistance, or to change rules that govern the cross-national flows of goods, services, capital, and people. Human rights norms might also change the practices of multinational firms and donors, making them more responsive to the needs of poor people in developing countries.
13 movement (Lieberman 2002; Smith 1997) , the French Revolution (Sewell 1985) , the emergence of international norms of multilateralism and human rights (Crawford 2002 HRBAs directly contributes to this change, and the circumstances under which it is ineffectual or, indeed, generates a backlash.
Constitutionally Based Legal Mobilization
Constitutionally based legal mobilization for social and economic rights takes different forms, but the most typical, which will be the focus here, is litigation before domestic courts.
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Court cases on social and economic rights have increased in frequency and scope in many parts of the world over the last two decades, including in developing countries (Langford 2008a) . It has become the focus of considerable attention -both from activists and scholars -as an avenue for bringing social and economic rights to bear in national politics. In a situation where many countries have adopted rights-rich constitutions and strengthened their judiciaries -and where democratic institutions are often weak or unresponsive to the needs of the poor -social rights litigation represents an alternative -decentralized‖ means for holding decisions-makers at different levels to account for their constitutional rights obligations as they set priorities and distribute resources in legislation, policies and administrative decisions.
When considering the pros and cons of litigation on social and economic rights, it is important to bear in mind that this is a diverse phenomenon, both in substance and form. Some countries and courts designate a broader range of social and economic rights as justiciable. The agents and form of litigation also varies. Individuals and group engage in litigation to improve their own individual situation and address specific needs -but social and economic rights litigation is also a strategy pursued by actors and organizations on behalf of others, usually disadvantaged groups in society, as a means to achieve structural change. institutions that can perform this task (e.g., Brazil), and others have neither.
From the perspective of democracy, social rights litigation is promising, but also presents challenges conceptually as well as in practice. Litigation is inclusive and (at its best) enables a broad set of actors to participate in public deliberation on social policies. It encourages relevant information to be presented in a structured manner. By providing an alternative arena for social contestation, litigation may enable or magnify voices that are marginalized in the political process (or conversely, it may provide an extra arena for the dominant voice). Inclusiveness and increased opportunities for participation, transparency and accountability are all ‗democratic goods' (Fredman 2008) . On the other hand, social rights litigation also brings to a head the democratic dilemma of justifying the authority of non-elected judges in overruling democratic priority setting and preference aggregation.
We will not go into the counter-majoritarian dilemma in any depth here. Suffice it to say that the process of judging social and economic rights have lead judges in different countries to develop new and creative forms of jurisprudence that seek to overcome this problem. Typically, this involves more dialogical forms of judgments, where the courts, rather than determining the material outcome of the case in detail, engage in a dialogue with political authorities.
To give some examples: The South African Constitutional Court, in the well known Implementation, though, is often the Achilles heel of legally based strategies (Shankar and Mehta 2008) . Critics have expressed doubts regarding the potential of litigation to bring about significant social change (Baxi 1988; Hirschl 2004; Rosenberg 1991) . It is argued that the ‗haves' are most likely to come out ahead in court, and that, even cases that do succeed in court are unlikely to lead to significant change unless they are supported by strong social actors, who are able to follow up on implementation and make the judgment bear on policy. It is also argued that human rights based mobilization is constraining political contestation within a liberal framework, and diverting the attention and resources of social movements away from other, Litigation can also contribute towards solving complex collective action problems that political bodies cannot (or at least do not) handle 11 The larger picture shows that many of the countries that have been at the forefront with regard to social rights litigation are middle-income countries marked by huge inequalities (such as Colombia, Brazil and South Africa, which are among the most unequal countries in the world). More generally, countries with significant state capacityincluding a reasonably well-functioning judiciary -but where large sections of the population are socially marginalised and the ruling elite is perceived as unresponsive -seem to provide particularly fertile grounds for social rights litigation.
adequately, such as pollution problems transcending jurisdictional boundaries or involving multiple public and private actors. It thus merits closer examination as a potential (partial) solution to fundamental democratic challenges.
We do, however, also know that litigation does not always provide an institutionalized voice for the poor. Under some conditions it is prone to elite (or at least middle-class) captureparticularly where litigation is a strategy pursued by individuals or groups for individual gain,  what makes certain courts more prone to take up these types of cases and to deal with them in a way that is conducive to social transformation; and  the contexts under which social rights jurisprudence generates political backlash.
With regard to the implementation phase we need:
 better methodologies -and more systematic empirical data -for evaluating the impact of social rights litigation.
Conclusion
Rights-based approaches to development have increased in popularity in recent years.
While they vary widely, their potential, as well as the modes of political change they have a chance of engendering, can be analyzed on the basis of the institutional mechanisms they speak through. We find four such mechanisms: global compliance, policies and programming, rights talk, and legal mobilization. The most convincing accounts available to date involve the theory and evidence of treaties and legal strategies. These accounts suggest that, under certain circumstances, human rights based strategies can make a difference. Rights talk is consequential in the long term, but little evidence is available on the short-term consequences of consciously designed rights talk strategies. Policies and programming regarding HRBAs typically encompass a broad array of neighboring development strategies, so much so that it can be said to be mainstream practice in development organizations. But further work needs to be done to disaggregate the impact of these various approaches to HRBA policies and programming.
